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Abstract
We study banking using the tools of mechanism design, without a priori as-
sumptions about what banks are, who they are, or what they do. Given
preferences, technologies, and certain frictions ￿including limited commitment
and imperfect monitoring ￿we describe the set of incentive feasible allocations
and interpret the outcomes in terms of institutions that resemble banks. Our
bankers endogenously accept deposits, and their liabilities help others in mak-
ing payments. This activity is essential: if it were ruled out the set of feasible
allocations would be inferior. We discuss how many and which agents play the
role of bankers. For example, we show agents who are more connected to the
market are better suited for this role since they have more to lose by reneg-
ing on obligations. We discuss some banking history and compare it with the
predictions of our theory.
￿We thank many colleagues for their helpful comments and discussions. Wright thanks the NSF
for research support. The views expressed in this paper are our own and do not necessarily re￿ ect
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. This paper is avail-
able free of charge at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/.
11 Introduction
Our goal is to study banking without making a priori assumptions about what banks
are, who they are, or what they do. To this end, we adopt the approach of mechanism
design. This method, in general, begins by describing an economic environment, by
which we mean preferences, technologies, and certain frictions ￿including spatial
or temporal separation, information problems, commitment issues, etc. One then
tries to describe the set of allocations that are attainable, respecting both resource
and incentive feasibility constraints. Sometimes one also describes allocations that
are optimal according to particular criteria. One then looks at these allocations
and tries to interpret the outcomes in terms of institutions that can be observed
in actual economies. We want to see if something that looks like banking emerges
as an outcome of this exercise. To reiterate, we do not take a bank as a primitive
concept. Our primitives are preferences, technologies, and frictions; and we want to
see if something like banking arises endogenously.
Much has been written about the virtues of mechanism design in general.1 Our
particular approach is close to that advocated by Townsend (1987,1990). He describes
the method as asking if institutions that we see in the world, such as observed credit
or insurance arrangements, can be derived from simple but internally consistent eco-
nomic models, whereby internal consistency we mean that one cannot simply assume
a priori that some markets are missing, contracts are incomplete, prices are sticky,
etc. Of course, something that looks like missing markets or incomplete contracts
may emerge, but the idea is to lay out the environment explicitly and derive this
as an outcome.2 Simple models, with minimal frictions, may not generate arrange-
1Seminal contributors to mechanism design have recently been honored with a Nobel prize;
go to http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/ecoadv07.pdf for a general de-
scription of the approach.
2As Townsend (1988) puts it: ￿The competitive markets hypothesis has been viewed primarily
as a postulate to help make the mapping from environments to outcomes more precise ... In the end
though it should be emphasised that market structure should be endogenous to the class of general
equilibrium models at hand. That is, the theory should explain why markets sometimes exist and
2ments that resemble those in actual economies; for example, they typically predict
that credit and insurance work better than the institutions we observe. So, one asks,
what additional complications can be introduced to bring the theory more in line
with what we see? We want to apply this method to study banking.
Obviously some frictions are needed, since models like Arrow-Debreu have no
role for banks. As has been discussed often, frictionless models o⁄ers no role for
any institution whose purpose is to facilitate the process of exchange. The simplest
example is the institution of money. A classic challenge in monetary economics is
to ask what frictions make money essential, in the following sense: Money is said
to be essential when the set of allocations that satisfy incentive and other feasibility
conditions is bigger or better with money than without it (Wallace 2001,2008). We
study the essentiality of banks in the same sense. Just like monetary economists
ought not take the role of money as given, for this issue, we cannot take banks as
primitive. In our environment, it is a good idea for the planner ￿or mechanism ￿to
have some agents perform certain functions that resemble salient elements of banking:
They take deposits, and their liabilities (claims on deposits) are used by others to
facilitate the exchange process. This activity is essential: If it were ruled out, the set
of feasible allocations would be inferior.3
The vast literature on banks is surveyed by Gorton and Winton (2002) and Freixas
and Rochet (2008). Much of this research is based on informational frictions, includ-
ing adverse selection, moral hazard, and costly state veri￿cation, that hinder the
channeling of funds from investors to entrepreneurs. One can distinguish broadly
three main strands. One approach originating with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in-
terprets banks as coalitions of agents providing insurance against liquidity shocks.
Another approach pioneered by Leland and Pyle (1977) and developed by Boyd and
sometimes do not, so that economic organisation falls out in the solution to the mechanism design
problem.￿
3Although we do not dwell on this issue in this paper, our approach is also useful to study
whether the essentiality of banks and money is compatible.
3Prescott (1986) interprets bank as coalitions sharing information in ways that induce
agents to truthfully reveal the quality of investments. A third approach based on
Diamond (1984) interprets banks as delegated monitors taking advantage of returns
to scale. All of these papers provide useful insights into the functions of banking,
although they often take as given institutional details that we want to endogenize,
especially when we study how many agents should become bankers, which ones, and
why, as well as their role in the payment process.4
The above information-based theory of banks has been criticized by Rajan (1998)
on the grounds that it assumes agents have a limitless ability to contract. Rajan
argues instead for a theory that relies on incomplete contracting. When the bank￿ s
abilities cannot be replicated in the market e.g., investment in reputation, then the
bank is essential. Rajan focuses on limited enforcement to explain why it is di¢ cult
for two parties to contract. We agree with Rajan that limited enforcement is key to
a theory of banking; however we go a step further and rather than taking the level
of enforcement (or the degree of market incompleteness) as given, our mechanism
design approach allows us to explain why enforcement is limited or inexistent for
some agents.5
Compared with some previous works, we focus more on commitment issues and
less on informational frictions, although imperfect monitoring is also an important
element of the model. We highlight limited commitment because banking concerns
4Work on the Diamond-Dybvig model is a large branch of the banking literature; see Jacklin
(1987), Wallace (1988,1990), Peck and Shell (2003), Green and Lin (2003), Andolfatto et al. (2007),
and Ennis and Keister (2008). Usually, if not always, Diamond-Dybvig models do not interpret the
bank as a self-interested agent, but as a contract or a mechanism, nor do they derive which agents
should be bankers. In the papers that emphasize information sharing or delegated monitoring, banks
are agents, but their role is restricted to solving information problems, and again they typically do
not derive endogenously which agents will be bankers. The fact that bank liabilities play a role in
the payment system is usually not considered at all, but see Andolfatto and Nosal (2008), Huangfu
and Sun (2008), Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), Williamson and Sanches (2008), He et al. (2005,2008),
Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,1999b), Wallace (2005), and Mills (2008).
5Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Myers and Rajan (1998), and Diamond and Rajan (2001) belong
to the incomplete markets approach to banking. These papers deal with the question of how to
implement a given level of commitment and ￿nd that the structure of the bank portfolio matters.
4intertemporal reallocation, and we want to take seriously incentives to make good
on credit obligations. Our agents can use stored output as collateral to ameliorate
commitment problems, but this does not work perfectly if collateral can be easily
liquidated.6 An implication is that delegated storage may be useful: If you deposit
your output with a third party who has less incentive or ability to liquidate it for
strategic reasons, others are more willing to give you credit. Thus, claims on deposits
can be used to facilitate transactions, and this resembles banking. This activity can
be part of an e¢ cient arrangement even if the third party has an inferior storage
technology. Thus, bank liabilities can be useful for payments even if dominated in
return. Although other things being equal, it is obviously better if the bank has
access to good storage or other investment opportunities.
The general idea is obviously correct that sellers often accept in payment the
obligation of a third party ￿which can take the form of a note, check, credit/debit
card, or other instrument issued by a commercial bank ￿when they would not accept
your personal IOU. We want to ask, however, why the third party is less inclined
than you to renege on obligations. In our approach, future rewards and punishments
mitigate strategic behavior, but monitoring is imperfect (opportunistic deviations are
detected only probabilistically). Agents with a higher likelihood of being monitored
have a greater incentive to make good on obligations and, hence, are better suited
to take on the responsibility of holding deposits. This is not a new insight ￿better
monitoring is the key characteristic underlying banks in, for example, the Cavalcanti-
Wallace (1999a,1999b) model, but it is nonetheless a valid insight. However, it seems
to pin a lot on the assumption that some agents are exogenously easier to monitor.
Therefore, we also assume that agents have di⁄erent probabilities of gaining from
market activity or have di⁄erent stakes in the economic system. Even with equal
6If, for example, a debtor can consume the goods, his promise to deliver them out of storage may
not be any more credible than a pledge to deliver goods out of future production. This is related
to the discussion in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) about why it is hard to borrow against capital. See
also Mills and Reed (2008) and the references therein.
5monitoring probabilities, those with a higher stake in the system are less inclined to
deviate from proscribed behavior, because they have more to potentially lose from
getting caught and punished (here punishment entails future autarky). Consistent
with the history of banking, as we discuss in detail below, individuals with a greater
connection to the market are better suited to be bankers because they have more to
lose by reneging on obligations, even if they can be monitored as well as others. We
then endogenize the monitoring intensity and ￿nd that it is cheaper to monitor those
agents with a greater connection to the market. When we collect these results, we
￿nd that bankers should be agents with a combination of the following characteristics:
They have access to good storage technologies or other investment opportunities; they
can be more easily monitored because they have more to gain from the market and,
therefore, more to potentially lose from strategic behavior.7
Even if these results are not too surprising, the analysis precisely identi￿es the
relevant e⁄ects and the nature of the trade-o⁄s when, for instance, we show how it
may be desirable to sacri￿ce rate of return by depositing wealth with parties that are
more easily monitored or have a bigger stake in the economic system. Similarly, when
we choose which agents should be monitored and, hence, could be good bankers, we
can show precisely how it is e¢ cient to choose those with the right combination of a
bigger stake in the system and better investment opportunities. Similarly, when we
discuss the e¢ cient number of banks, we can lay out the trade-o⁄ between having
fewer bankers, which reduces monitoring costs, and having more deposits per bank,
which increases incentives to misbehave. All of this comes directly out of a mechanism
design approach, without primitive assumptions about what is a bank, who is a bank,
or what banks do. And, as we discuss, these implications are useful for analyzing
the history of banking. Therefore, we think the approach provides some new and
interesting insights.
7The theory also predicts that agents who are more patient are better suited for the role of
banker, although we emphasize this less.
6The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic eco-
nomic environment, emphasizing the roles of temporal separation, limited commit-
ment, and imperfect monitoring. Section 3 characterizes incentive feasible (IF) and
optimal allocations in a baseline version of the model with one sector, by which we
mean one group of ex ante homogeneous agents. Section 4 considers an economy with
more than one sector, by which we mean di⁄erent groups of ex ante heterogeneous
agents (in general, they may have di⁄erent attachments to the market, monitoring
e¢ ciencies, and storage technologies). This section contains the main result on the
essentiality of activities that resemble banking: We show that it can be desirable to
have agents make deposits with others (delegated storage), and claims on these de-
posits facilitate exchange. Section 5 provides results on which individuals are suited
to be bankers, how to monitor them when it is costly, and why deposits can be useful
for payments even if they are dominated in rate of return. Section 6 is the conclusion.
Although the framework is quite tractable, there are some technical details involved
in several of the proofs that we relegate to the Appendix.
2 The Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There are N ￿ 1 di⁄erent sectors, whereby a
sector we mean a group of ex ante homogeneous agents, while in general, agents are
heterogeneous across sectors. The role of sectors will be clear later. A representative
sector has a set A of agents that each period is partitioned into three groups, A0,
A1 and A2, with measures ￿0;￿1, and ￿2. For now A is arbitrary (e.g., it could
be ￿nite or in￿nite). Agents take it as given that each period they belong to Ai
with probability ￿i. Agents in A1 and A2 are called traders of type 1 and 2: They
potentially produce, consume, and derive payo⁄s as described below. Agents in A0 are
called nontraders; during that period they neither consume nor produce and derive a
payo⁄normalized to 0. Among other things, this setup captures the idea that agents
7can have di⁄erent stakes in the economy: A bigger ￿0 means that you have less to
gain from participating in the market, which will play a critical role in the dynamic
incentive conditions below.
In each period there are two goods, 1 and 2. Agents in A1 consume good 1 and
produce good 2, whereas agents in A2 consume good 2 and produce good 1. Letting
xi and yi denote consumption and production by type i, assume utility Ui (xi;yi) is
increasing in xi, decreasing in yi, and satis￿es the usual convexity conditions. Also,
Ui (0;0) = 0. A key friction is temporal separation: We divide each period in two
and assume good i must be consumed in subperiod i. This implies a role for credit,
since type 1 consumes before type 2. To have a notion of collateral, assume good 2
is produced in the ￿rst subperiod although it is consumed in the second and, hence,
must be stored across subperiods. Another key friction is that type 2 agents cannot
store good 2 for themselves, because this would eliminate temporal separation and
any interesting discussion of credit. Thus, only a producer of good 2 can store it.
A unit of good 2 stored in the ￿rst subperiod returns 1 + ￿ units in the second; we
set ￿ = 0 for now and consider ￿ 6= 0 below. Although goods can be stored across
subperiods, they fully depreciate across periods.
Collateral here works as follows: We can potentially get type 1 agents to produce
good 2 by o⁄ering them good 1 in the ￿rst subperiod and then ask them to deliver good
2 in the second subperiod, after the production cost has been sunk. In a real sense,
they are getting a loan to consume good 1, with a promise to deliver good 2 later,
backed by storage. To make this imperfect, however, we let type 1 get liquidation
utility ￿x2 if they consume x2 out of storage; and if ￿ > 0, there is an opportunity
cost to delivering the goods, even if the production cost is sunk.8 We allow a given
type 1 agent to derive liquidation utility from any good 2, even if it was produced by
another agent, including one from a di⁄erent sector. However, only goods produced
8The assumption of linear liquidation value ￿x2 is merely to ease the presentation; we could use
U1 (x1;y1;x2), but it adds little other than notation.
8within a sector enter Ui (xi;yi), which means that any transfers across sectors here
will be due to incentive considerations and not the usual gains for trade. Also, we
assume that U1 (x1;y1) + ￿y1 ￿ U1 (x1;0) for any x1, so that it is never e¢ cient for
type 1 to produce good 2 for their own (liquidation) consumption.





for each sector i, plus, as we discuss later, descriptions of cross-sector transfers, stor-
age, and liquidation. The planner, or mechanism, collects all production and allocates
it to consumers. Therefore, agents deal directly with the planner, but this is relevant
only to the extent that we do not restrict them to bilateral trade: The frictions here
do not concern the search for a trading partner, but whether a given trader can be
trusted to honor a deal. Note that the planner does not store good 2: It is stored
by its producer in subperiod 1, then delivered to the planner in subperiod 2, who
can pass it on to a consumer (our planner￿ s job is only to organize trade, not to
engage any any form of storage or other production). Assuming for now there are no
transfers across sectors or liquidation, an allocation is resource feasible if ￿2y2 = ￿1x1
and ￿1y1 = ￿2x2 and hence can be summarized by x = (x1;x2). To reduce notation,
without a⁄ecting the interesting results, we set ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ and ￿0 = 1 ￿ 2￿.
Let ￿ = ￿￿￿=(1￿￿), where ￿ is the discount factor across periods and ￿ represents
a monitoring technology in the following sense. Our planner, or mechanism, makes
recommendations for production, trade and consumption. Agents are free to go along
with these recommendations or to deviate from them, potentially facing the risk
of punishment. Any deviation by an agent from a recommendation is detected, or
monitored, with probability ￿.9 When a deviation is monitored, the agent is punished
9Imperfect monitoring has obviously been studied by many people in di⁄erent areas of economics,
and we cannot survey them all here. In theories of money and banking, Kocherlakota (1998) makes
clear the critical function of monitoring (what he calls memory) but only studies the extremes of
perfect or no monitoring. Less extreme versions are studied by Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998),
who assume actions can be monitored with a lag, and Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,1999b), who
assume some agents can be monitored while others cannot. Our version is that some deviations can
be monitored probabilistically, while others cannot.
9with autarchy, which means permanent banishment from future market production
and consumption (one could consider weaker punishments, but permanent autarchy is
obviously the most e⁄ective). Notice ￿ measures the risk of deviating: the probability
of being detected ￿, times one￿ s connection to the market ￿, times the weight one puts
on future participation ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). This conveniently makes ￿ the critical parameter
in the incentive conditions discussed below.
This completes the basic environment, but some special cases are perhaps worth
mentioning. First, Ui may be additively separable, in which case we can make it
quasi-linear without loss in generality by an appropriate choice of units, say Ui =
ui(xi) ￿ xj. This means that U1 is linear in one good and U2 in the other. It would
be di⁄erent to make them both linear in the same good, say U1 = x1 ￿ v(x2) and
U2 = u(x2) ￿ x1, meaning that all the gains from trade accrue from x2 (thus x1 is
only relevant for incentive reasons, if at all). We can even eliminate x1 altogether
and assume, again without loss in generality, that x2 enters one function linearly, say
U1 = ￿x2 and U2 = u(x2). In this case, there is nothing one can do to reward type
1 for producing within a period, so incentives involve only future promises, while
in general both intertemporal and intratemporal incentives matter. Since it nests
all these cases, we study the general speci￿cation Ui(xi;xj), although separable and
quasi-linear examples are sometimes useful, mainly for reducing notation.10
3 A One-Sector Economy
For now, cross-sector transfers are impossible. We are interested in the set of (sta-
tionary and symmetric) IF allocations in a sector. The mechanism recommends an
allocation, summarized by x = (x1;x2), since consumption by type 1 equals produc-
tion by type 2 and vice versa. A recommendation x can be implemented if it is IF,
10In particular, we do not use quasi-linear utility for the major simplication in Lagos and Wright
(2005), despite a super￿cial resemblance in the applications and in the environments (with the
multiple subperiods, a double coincidence problem, etc.).
10which means that no one wants to deviate. Although we focus on the case in which
agents cannot commit to future actions and therefore may deviate whenever they like,
we begin by describing what might happen if they could commit to some degree.
3.1 Benchmark Allocations
When agents can fully commit, stationary allocations are constrained only by one
participation condition
S(x1;x2) ￿ 0; (1)
where S(x1;x2) ￿ U1(x1;x2) + U2(x1;x2) is the total surplus per period. In this
case, IF allocations only have to generate a greater surplus than autarchy. In any
period, we can have Ui < 0 for one i, as long as S is positive. Although we generally
want to characterize the entire IF set, we can consider the ex ante Pareto optimal,
or PO, allocation xo = (xo
1;xo
2) that maximizes S. It is easy to see that, with full
commitment, xo is always IF.
The above benchmark is essentially static: Interesting notions of credit and in-
tertemporal incentives do not arise. In fact, full commitment here is equivalent to
commitment for one period, before types are realized, even if agents cannot commit
across periods. Suppose now that agents can commit only within a period after types








S(x1;x2), i = 1;2, j 6= i:
The left side is the payo⁄ to type i who follows the recommendation; the right is
the payo⁄to a deviator, who gets detected and punished with probability ￿ and gets
away with it with probability 1￿￿.11 Using ￿ = ￿￿￿=(1￿￿), the above inequalities
11A deviation here means neither producing nor consuming during that period; alternatives, like
consuming but not producing, which can be interpreted as a change in the timing, can be analyzed
similarly.
11reduce to what we call the dynamic participation, or DP, conditions12
U
i (xi;xj) + ￿S(x1;x2) ￿ 0, i = 1;2, j 6= i: (2)
Notice (2) implies (1) but not vice versa: With full commitment, we can always
have Ui < 0 as long as S ￿ 0, while now we can have Ui < 0 only if future rewards
are su¢ ciently great, and this depends on ￿. Also, now we may not be able to
support the ex ante PO allocation xo. Consider U1 = ￿x2 and U2 = u(x2), so that
xo




2] ￿ 0, which holds i⁄ ￿ is large enough. This illustrates how
intertemporal incentives matter. One can interpret this as a model of credit, but it
misses some of what we want. In particular, while we must give agent 1 an incentive to
produce for agent 2, once he agrees he cannot renege. That is, once agent 1 agrees to
produce good 2 in the second subperiod in exchange for good 1 in the ￿rst subperiod,
he is committed to honor this obligation.
To relax commitment, one could consider what happens when x2 is actually pro-
duced in the second subperiod. Now to get type 1 to produce good 2, after he has












1 (x1;x2) ￿ U
1 (x1;0) + ￿S(x1;x2) ￿ 0: (3)
Now IF allocations satisfy (2) for type 2 and (3) for type 1. This captures a notion
of credit without commitment and (3) can be interpreted as a repayment constraint,
saying we must provide type 1 with the incentive to honor his obligations ex post.
In what follows we focus on a di⁄erent model, however, where type 1 produces good
2 in the ￿rst subperiod and stores it but may or may not deliver it in the second
12This is a dynamic participation condition because agents can decide to participate every period
after types have been revealed, as well as ex-ante, as captured by (1).
12subperiod, because this is a useful way to think about collateral considerations and
ultimately deposit banking.
3.2 The Baseline Model
If type 1 produces good 2 in the ￿rst subperiod and stores it to the second subperiod,
he can derive liquidation value ￿x2 by consuming instead of delivering it. Thus, he










where the payo⁄ to a deviator on the right involves consuming x1 and producing x2
in the ￿rst subperiod, then liquidating in the second, whence with probability ￿ he
is punished and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ he is not. This can be simpli￿ed to what we
call the repayment constraint
￿￿x2 + ￿S(x1;x2) ￿ 0: (4)
If ￿ = 0, (4) is implied by (1), so IF allocations are constrained only by (2). Intuitively,
￿ = 0 implies the production cost is sunk when it comes time to deliver x2, so collateral
works very well ￿in fact it gets us back to full commitment.
If ￿ > 0, however, in general the set of IF allocations is given by the DP constraint
(2) for both types and the repayment constraint (4) for type 1. Let F0 denote the set
of IF allocations. It is easy to show that F0 is convex. Also F0 is trivially nonempty
as (0;0) 2 F0. It contains more points, as long as we make some mild assumptions
that imply that there are gains from trade.13 Figure 1 shows F0 delimited by three
13Su¢ cient conditions for this are: i) ￿ is not too big, and ii) the slope of the curve de￿ned by









Figure 1: Incentive constraints and F0.









2 (x2;x1) + ￿S (x1;x2) = 0
￿
Cr ￿ fx : ￿￿x2 + ￿S (x1;x2) = 0g
Let ￿j 6= (0;0) be the point where Cr intersects Cj. We assume ￿1 and ￿2 are unique
(a single-crossing condition), as shown in Figure 1.
In terms of economics, the key point is that the liquidation option implies an
opportunity cost of delivering the goods, making collateral imperfect: A promise to
deliver x2 from storage may not be more credible than a promise to produce it. Given
￿, collateralized credit only works if ￿ is big, similar to other forms of credit. So credit
works better ￿that is, we can sustain a bigger and better set of allocations (x1;x2) ￿
when agents are patient (￿ big), have a sizable connection to the market (￿ is big),
and are more easily monitored (￿ is big). Given ￿, collateralized credit works better
14when ￿ is smaller.14




W (x1;x2) = !1U





where !j is the Pareto weight on type j = 0;1;2 with !1￿ + !2￿ + !0 (1 ￿ 2￿) = 1.
For given !j, let x￿ solve (5). This contrasts with the ex ante PO allocation xo that
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j is the partial of Ui with respect to argument j. In what follows, we assume
that goods are normal, that is, for type 1 agents, consumption x1 is increasing and
production x2 is decreasing in wealth, while for type 2 agents, consumption x2 is in-
creasing and production x1 is decreasing, in a standard utility maximization problem.
Normal goods implies all terms in parentheses in (9) are positive, and hence implies
the curve P slopes downward in (x1;x2) space:




14When U1 = u1(x1) ￿ x2, for example, the repayment condition (4) reduces to ￿￿x2 +
￿S(x1;x2) ￿ 0 while (2) reduces to u1(x1) ￿ x2 + ￿S(x1;x2) ￿ 0, and the former is more strin-
gent i⁄ type 1￿ s surplus u1(x1) ￿ x2 exceeds the opportunity cost of liquidation ￿￿x2. This is
particularly transparent when U1 = ￿x2, in which case the repayment condition is more stringent






Figure 2: Pareto set and incentive feasible sets under full, partial, and no commitment.
Figure 2 shows F0 and P for some parametric examples (Ui (x;y) =
p
x ￿ y,
￿ = 3=4;￿ = ￿ = 1=2 and ￿ = 1). Note that P is downward sloping (Lemma 1).
Also, P may or may not intersect F0, depending on ￿ and ￿. Similarly, the ex-ante
PO allocation xo is in P but may or may not be in F0. For the sake of illustration,
Figure 2 also shows the IF set when we have full commitment FF and the IF set
when we have partial commitment FP, with full and partial commitment as de￿ned
in Section 3.1.
Figure 3 shows what happens when we change ￿, ￿, or ￿ so that ￿ increases from
￿
a to ￿
b. Since this realxes all the incentive conditions, it shifts C1 up, C2 down, and
Cr out, expanding F0. Notice also that both ￿1 and ￿2 shift to the northeast in this
example. The following lemma tells us that this is a general result when Cr cuts C1
from above (the proof is in the Appendix). Moreover, since decreasing ￿ a⁄ects only
the repayment constraint, it shifts Cr out and does not shift C1 and C2. Therefore,
decreasing ￿ also shifts ￿1 and ￿2 northeast.






























i in (x1;x2) space. Otherwise, ￿
b








4 A Multi-Sector Economy
It will su¢ ce to focus on N = 2. Label the sectors a and b, and assume the following:
Each period in sector i = a;b, with probability ￿i agents are type 1i or 2i traders,
producing and consuming goods 1i and 2i; they are nontraders with probability 1￿￿i;
we can detect deviations with probability ￿i; and type 1i agents have a liquidation
value ￿
i.15 Type 1i can store and can liquidate either good 2i produced in sector i
or good 2j produced in sector j 6= i. There are no gains from trade across sectors
for pure mercantile reasons, because goods produced in sector i do not enter Uj and
vice versa. But suppose t units of good 2 are produced by all type 1b agents and
15We also assume that each sector contains the same population in the sense that the cardinality
of A is the same. Later we relax this assumption.
17transferred to type 1a in the other sector, and the latter liquidate it. Assuming no
one liquidates their own production, which is never e¢ cient, utility for type 1b is then
U1(xb
1;xb
2 +t), since they produce xb
2 for type 2b in their own sector and t for type 1b
in the other sector, and utility for type 1a is U1(xa
1;xa
2) + ￿
a￿bt=￿a, given the total
transfer ￿bt is shared equally among a measure ￿a of agents.
These transfers reduce total surplus. Still, they can have incentive e⁄ects, which
we need to analyze for the following reason. We are ultimately interested in the case
in which some good 2 is produced by type 1b and transferred to type 1a for storage,
and the latter do not liquidate but transfer it back to (2b agents in) sector b. This
delegated storage, we think, captures some features of banking and is essential in the
sense that it can change the IF set for the better. Now, direct transfers also change
the IF set, but we claim that delegated storage can do better. To make this case,
we must ￿rst analyze transfers. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case in
which ￿i and ￿i are such that ￿
b ￿ ￿
a, which means type 1b agents have less of a
commitment problem than type 1a, because they value future rewards more than the
gain from short-term opportunism. If F
j
0 denotes the IF set in sector j, then clearly
Fa
0 ￿ Fb
0, as shown in Figure 3.
We also assume ￿
a ￿ ￿
b, which implies that type 1 agents in sector a have a
greater ability to liquidate or get greater utility from liquidating.
4.1 Direct Transfers













































16We typically consider a transfer t in only one direction, for example from sector b to a, since
transfers in the other direction are symmetric, and it is never useful to have simultaneous transfers
in both directions. Also, note that one can think of t as a tax, but it is not compulsory: We can ask
1b to voluntarily yield t, but they agree i⁄ it satis￿es the relevant incentive conditions.
18Obviously we need Si (xi
1;xi



















￿ 0, i = a;b; (10)















































￿ 0, i = a;b: (13)
The IF set for the two-sector model with transfer t satis￿es (10)-(13).
We can use t > 0 to relax the constraints in sector a, at the cost of tightening
them in sector b. Notice that t a⁄ects the repayment constraint (13) only through
the future surplus Si (xi
1;xi
2;t) and a⁄ects the DP conditions (11) and (12) directly.
Whenever the constraints are binding in sector a but not b, t 6= 0 can expand the IF
set. Therefore, transfers are essential in the technical sense used in the Introduction.






that entails the biggest transfer t from sector b to a, subject to (10)-(13).







left sides of the constraints are increasing in ￿
b, so is ~ t: When agents are more patient,
more connected to the market, or more frequently monitored, we can extract more
from them.
Some examples illustrate how this works. First, suppose U1 (x1;x2) = x1￿x2 and
U2 (x2;x1) = u(x2) ￿ x1. Further assume ￿
b = 0, to make the example stark. Then





















































2 ￿ t ￿ 0: (16)













= 0, and (14)-(16) hold with equality. Thus,
we can get the agents to produce the x￿
2 that maximizes the surplus and then tax away
the entire surplus with ~ t; because ￿
b = 0, we do not have to worry about repayment.
In this extreme case, ￿






As another example, let U1 (x1;x2) = ￿x2 and U2 (x2;x1) = u(x2), and set ￿
b = 1.


















































Clearly (17) and (19) are not binding, given t ￿ 0, so we need to worry about only























b. Notice ~ xb
2 < x￿
2. Also, notice @~ xb
2=@￿
b > 0 and @~ t=@￿
b >










to cover the cost
of producing both for type 2 in his sector plus the transfer to the other sector, xb
2 +t.
And then, when he is supposed to deliver x2 out of storage, we have to provide him
with the incentive to cover the opportunity cost of liquidation ￿
bxb
2 = xb
2, but this is
not binding when t ￿ 0.
The point is that we can use transfers to extract t > 0 from 1b in sector b and
subsidize type 1a agents, thereby relaxing constraints in sector a. Again, it is no
surprise that taxes and transfers can increase the IF set; we present these results only
to con￿rm that deposits can do even more than transfers.
4.2 Deposits: Delegated Storage
Again, the planner collects production and redistributes goods for consumption and
storage in both sectors, but now in addition to transfers, the planner deposits d ￿ 0
20units of good 1a with type 1b. We still face the DP constraints (10) for type 2i and
(11)-(12) for type 1a and 1b, respectively. With deposits, type 1a only stores xa
2 ￿ d,










2;t) ￿ 0: (21)
Similarly, type 1b stores xb


















If d > 0, then (22) implies (13) in sector b, while (13) implies (21) in sector a. Notice
that deposits only interact with transfers in the liquidation value, not the continuation
payo⁄. Finally, the planner faces the resource constraint17
0 ￿ d ￿ x
a
2: (23)









transfers t and deposits d such that (10)-(12) and (21)-(23) hold. We now prove one
of the main results: Delegated storage d > 0 is essential.
Proposition 1 F0 ￿ Fd for any feasible d > 0 and for some parameters FdnF0 6= ?.
One can prove this as follows. First obviously any IF allocation with d = 0 is
feasible when deposits are allowed. Then, to show that more allocations may be
feasible, it su¢ ces to give an example. Suppose that ￿
b = 0. We claim that there are
some allocations in sector a that are only feasible when d > 0. Set t = ~ t, to maximize












, all incentive constraints




































17We can also allow agents in sector b to deposit goods in sector a by d < 0, which makes the
resource constraint ￿xb
2 ￿ d ￿ xa
2, but for now we focus on d ￿ 0.






















increasing deposits will relax the repayment constraint and, therefore, expand the
IF set. In fact, if we set d = xa
2, the repayment constraint becomes Sa (xa
1;xa
2;t) ￿
0, which is redundant. Thus, d > 0 can expand F0 to Fd. We will give some
more detailed examples below, but ￿rst, we want to discuss what we think is the
key economic idea. Suppose you want consumption now and pledge to later deliver
something in return, out of stored inventory. When the time to make good rolls
around, you are faced with a temptation to renege and liquidate the inventory. By
depositing resources with a third party, this temptation is relaxed. Of course, one also
has to consider temptation for the third party, but suppose for the sake of argument
that this is not binding. Then deposits allow you to get more consumption now
than private promises. One can interpret the third party as a bank with deposits as
liabilities. And one can interpret these liabilities as helping to facilitate transactions:
You are able to get more consumption because future payments to the producer are
backed by deposits ￿by the banker￿ s good name, so to speak. It is as if you o⁄ered a
deposit receipt, like people exchanged bank notes historically or checks, debit cards,
etc., in more modern times, as a means of payment.
We are not primarily concerned with details regarding how one might implement
IF allocations: Our planner can in principle simply tell agents what to do and monitor
them (albeit randomly) to verify compliance. To make this work, however, some
record keeping is obviously required. For instance, we can use a spreadsheet to keep
track over time of the agents who are supposed to deliver and receive goods. But
suppose keeping records in this way is costly. Then it would be more e¢ cient to
adopt the following scheme: In the ￿rst subperiod, a type 1a agent gives a type 1b
agent, his banker, goods in exchange for a deposit receipt; 1a then gives the receipt
to a type 2a agent in exchange for goods; the banker 1b stores the deposits, while the
22producer 2a holds the asset, until the second subperiod; then 2a redeems the asset
with 1b in exchange for goods. By showing the receipt to the planner, the banker
1b can verify that he made good by clearing the payment. Although our model is
abstract, this clearly resembles a banking arrangement.18
To illustrate how d > 0 expands the IF set in more detail, suppose U1 (x1;x2) =
x1 ￿x2, U2 (x2;x1) = u(x2)￿x1, ￿a = ￿b, and ￿
a > ￿

































at] ￿ 0: (26)
Let ~ t = u(x￿
2)￿x￿
2 be the maximumfeasible transfer. Increasing t from zero to ~ t relaxes
all constraints. Increasing d from 0 relaxes the repayment constraint (26). Because
the utilities of both agents are linearly separable in xa
1, the repayment constraint is
independent of xa
1 and it, therefore, de￿nes an upper bound ￿ xa
2 for xa
2.19 Increasing d
makes the upper bound bigger and expands the IF set. Figure 4 shows the IF set in
sector a for three cases: t = 0 and d = 0 in red; t = ~ t and d = 0 in red and green;
and t = ~ t and d = xa
2 in red, green, and blue. Note that the IF set in sector b is
independent of d.
The next example shows we do not need ￿
b = 0. Consider U1 (x1;x2) = ￿x2,
18As Selgin (2006) puts it, ￿Genuine banks are distinguished from other kinds of ￿nancial inter-
mediaries by the readily transferable or ￿ spendable￿nature of their IOUs, which allows those IOUs
to serve as a means of exchange, that is, money... Commercial bank money today consists mainly of
deposit balances that can be transferred either by means of paper orders known as checks or elec-
tronically using plastic ￿ debit￿cards.￿We have more to say about these issues below, but we want to
mention that many regard the English goldsmiths as the original modern bankers, precisely because
their receipts circulated in payment (see Section 6 for references). These receipts were the ￿rst
incarnation of banknotes. Shortly thereafter, they also allowed deposits to be transfered by ￿drawn
note￿or check. Originally, the depositors were speci￿cally interested in safe keeping, which would be
a consideration if we introduced theft; see He at al (2005,2008) or Sanchez and Williamson (2008).
Relatedly, one could also introduce counterfeiting considerations; see Nosal and Wallace (2007) and
the references therein.
19Thus, ￿ xa





23Figure 4: An example in which deposits are essential.
U2 (x2;x1) = u(x2), and ￿
a = ￿
b = 1; the only di⁄erence between sectors may be ￿.







2 R2. For the moment, assume the planner seeks to expand the set of IF
allocations in sector a. The DP constraints for types 2a and 2b are not binding. The
relevant constraints in sector b are
￿x
b




























Given t = ~ t, we obtain
￿~ x
b

























2 ￿ ~ t
￿
￿ 0 (30)
where ~ t and ~ xb
2 are de￿ned by (20).








2 ￿ ~ t
￿
24in the second,













Hence d = ~ t is the biggest deposit type 1b can accept given they transfer ~ t to sector a.
At d = ~ t, the constraints in sector b are tight, but those in sector a are most relaxed.
The IF set in sector a is de￿ned by
￿x
a

















2 + ~ t
￿
￿ 0: (32)
Since d ￿ ~ t, only (32) is binding. Therefore, increasing d from 0 to d > 0 expands
the IF set in sector a. Symmetrically, we can also expand the IF set in sector b and
note that ￿
b ￿ ￿
a implies ~ tb ￿ ~ ta.20
For the example, U1 (x1;x2) = ￿x2 and U2 (x2;x1) =
p







space for several cases21: ti = di = 0 in dark red; ti > 0 and di = 0 for i = a
in dark and medium red, and i = b in dark red plus medium blue. For ti;di > 0; Fb
0
is given by the projection of the areas that are dark, medium, and light red on the xb
2
space, while Fa
0 is given by the projection of the areas in dark red and in medium and
light blue on the xa
2 space. One panel shows ￿
a = ￿
b, and the other shows ￿
a < ￿
b.
Clearly, the IF set expands more in the sector with lower ￿
j. When only transfers
are used (dark red plus medium red or medium blue zones), there are two reasons for
this. First, ￿
b > ￿
a implies more resources can be extracted from sector b to transfer
to a. Second, because utility is concave, transfers have di⁄erent e⁄ects across sectors:
Since agents in sector b can sustain better outcomes on their own, they do not gain










u0 (^ x2) ￿ 1 =
1
(1 + ￿)
2u(^ x2) > 0,
where the last equality follows from the de￿nition of ^ x2 as the value for which u0 (^ x2) = (1 + ￿)=￿.
21To be precise, given x
j
2, Fi






Figure 5: Left: ￿
i = 0:9 for i = a;b. Right: ￿




a, agents in sector b have more to lose if they liquidate storage. Hence, we can
store more in sector b than a. We will expand on this in the next section.22
5 Extensions and Applications
5.1 Who Should Be a Banker?
Having shown that deposits are essential, we now ask who should hold them. To
address this, suppose that the two sectors have the same preferences, but potentially
di⁄erent ￿
i or ￿i. In terms of ￿
i, this can be due to di⁄erent ￿i or ￿i. Even with
equal monitoring probabilities, e.g. those with a higher ￿i are less inclined to deviate
opportunistically: consistent with experience, as discussed below, individuals with a
greater connection to the market are better suited to play the role of bankers, because
they have more to lose by absconding with the deposits.
22Note that in this example, deposits alone do not expand the IF set. Suppose t = 0. Then (31)
and (32) tell us the DP constraint (31) always implies the repayment constraint (32) for any d ￿ 0:
absent transfers, 1a agents are not compensated for their production in subperiod 1, except through
future payo⁄s. Deposits without transfers do not relax this constraint. This is, however, an artifact
of the example, in which type 1 agents do not derive utility from good 1. In the appendix ??, we
provide examples in which deposits are essential even when t = 0.










At ^ xi, there is no IF allocation in sector i that makes one type better o⁄ without
hurting the other type. The allocation ^ xi has the following property.
Lemma 3 If the repayment constraint is not binding at ^ xi, then ^ xi 2 P.
Proof: Let ￿i and ’ be the Lagrange multipliers on the DP constraint for type
i = 1;2, and the repayment constraint respectively. Suppose the repayment constraint
















































This implies ^ x 2 P. ￿
Now we allow transfers and deposits and ask, given ^ xa and ^ xb, can we make
agents in sector j better o⁄ without hurting agents in sector i? Transfers alone
clearly cannot help: A sector making a transfer is always worse o⁄.23 If deposits
can help, we say deposits in sector j are Pareto essential, or PE.24 More precisely,
deposits in sector i are PE if there is an allocation
￿
~ xa; ~ xb￿
and deposits d > 0 such
that Wj (~ xj) ￿ Wj (^ xj) for j = a;b with at least one strict inequality. Notice that
a necessary condition for PE in sector i is that the repayment constraint does not
bind at ^ xi. Otherwise, strictly positive deposits in sector i will make the repayment
constraints tighter, thus shrinking the IF set.
23Here we do not ask whether t and d together could help, and we only study deposits when we
impose t = 0.
24The term ￿essential￿means that the set of IF allocation becomes bigger or better. Here we
mean better, which is why we use the term ￿Pareto essential￿ . Notice also that if one sector can be
made better o⁄, then both sectors can be made better o⁄ with a small transfer.




b. Then only deposits in sector b are PE.








Case 1: Suppose x￿ 2 Fi
0;i = a;b, then d 6= 0 is not PE.
Case 2: Suppose x￿ 2 Fb
0 and x￿ = 2 Fa
0. d < 0 can only hurt in sector a as it
tightens the repayment constraint and cannot help in sector b. On the other hand,
d > 0 does not hurt sector b and helps in sector a, if and only if the repayment
constraint binds.
Case 3: Suppose x￿ = 2 Fb
0 and x￿ = 2 Fa






j = a;b, exactly once for x 6= (0;0), by assumption. We now show that d < 0 is not
PE. To verify this, notice with no transfers that d < 0 is PE only if the repayment
constraint is not binding at ^ xa. Suppose this is true. Since x￿ = 2 Fa
0, one DP constraint
binds, so either ^ xa 2 Ca
1 or ^ xa 2 Ca
2. Suppose ^ xa 2 Ca
1 (the other case is similar). We
know by Lemma 3 that ^ xa 2 P, as shown in Figure 6. Also, x￿ is northwest of ^ xa, as
moving along P toward x￿ increases W.
Since in case 3, x￿ = 2 Fb
0, either ^ xb 2 Cb
1 or ^ xb 2 Cb







1 from above, and to the southwest otherwise. By
Lemma 1, starting at ^ xa, moving along P toward x￿, we hit Cb




1 from above or below. Hence, as shown ^ xb 2 Cb
1 and ^ xb = 2 Cb
r. This
implies d < 0 cannot help, since the repayment constraint is not binding in sector b.
Finally, we show d > 0 may be PE. To see this, simply consider any economy in
which the repayment constraint binds in sector a but not in sector b. It is easy to
build examples like this (e.g., ￿
a = 0 and ￿
b = 0). See Figure 7 for another example.
Figure 8 illustrates Proposition 2 for the case in which x￿ is feasible in sector b but
not in sector a. When deposits are not used, Fa
0 is shown in orange, while Fb
0 is shown
in light red and blue. Since x￿ 2 Fb































Figure 8: Illustration of Proposition 2.
But x￿ = 2 Fa
0, and the ￿gure shows indi⁄erence curves for the planner, including one
through ^ xa. Introducing d > 0 shifts the repayment constraint in sector b inward
and the one in sector a outward, shrinking the IF set in sector b by the red area and
increasing it in sector a by the green area. This has no e⁄ect on welfare in sector b,
since x￿ is still feasible, but makes sector a better o⁄, since a better allocation ~ xa is
now feasible.
As shown, ￿b > ￿a implies we can make sector a better o⁄ without hurting sector
b by allowing the former to make deposits with the latter. Proposition 2 says we
cannot make sector b better o⁄without hurting sector a when ￿b > ￿a. In conclusion,
those agents who have more at stake in the market, in the sense of larger ￿, are more
suited to become bankers. Of course, there is nothing special about ￿; what matters
is a higher ￿, which in principle can be due to higher ￿, ￿, or ￿. It is e¢ cient to get
others to produce goods by o⁄ering them consumption then take their output and
store it with a banker, with a higher ￿, since this means he can more credibly commit
30to honoring claims on these deposits than the original producer.
5.2 Who Should Be Monitored?
Monitoring is a costly activity, and we now analyze the planner￿ s problem when
he incurs a monitoring cost. To simplify the analysis, we distinguish between the
probability of monitoring production, which we ￿x at ￿ 2 [0;1] in both sectors,
and the probability of monitoring repayment, which we denote by ￿ ￿
i in sector i and
determine endogenously. We assume the cost of monitoring with probability ~ ￿i is






i (x) ￿ ￿ ￿k
i s.t. x 2 ￿ F and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, (33)
where Wi (x) and ￿ Fi
0 are as above, except the repayment constraint is now
￿￿x
i














i￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿). Clearly (34) is binding; otherwise, we could reduce moni-
toring costs.26
In this application, we are interested in minimizing total monitoring costs, rather
than asking if deposits are PE.27 Also, in this section, we assume there is exactly
one agent in A1 in each sector at each date. This means that we have exactly one
candidate banker in each sector and we simply want to know which one is the better
candidate (below we also discuss what happens more generally). Note that we can
still have di⁄erent ￿a and ￿b, if we relax the assumption that the total population in
Aa and Ab are the same.
25Later we relax this assumption and assume that the cost of monitoring is c = k0 + ~ ￿k to allow
for increasing returns to scale.
26Also, notice that x￿ is never e¢ cient when monitoring is endogenous: Reducing monitoring
implies a ￿rst order gain, while moving away from x￿ entails only a second order loss.
27With transferable utility and !1 = !2 = !, when monitoring is paid out of production, we
can use transfer t to compensate type 1b for the increase in monitoring cost and tax type 1a for
decrease in monitoring cost. Therefore, any decrease in total monitoring cost with transfer is Pareto
improving.
31If agents from sector j deposit goods with sector i, the planner can reduce ￿ ￿
j. The
di¢ culty is that the repayment constraint always binds in both sectors. Therefore,
agents 1i need to be monitored more intensively. Although this is costly, it may be
desirable if total monitoring costs are lower. Precisely, deposits d in sector i reduce
the overall monitoring costs if ￿ ￿
i increases to ￿ ￿
i0 and ￿ ￿









i ￿ ￿ ￿
i0￿




= (￿ xa; ￿ xb). If ￿b ￿ ￿a, ￿
b ￿ ￿
a, and kb ￿ ka, then only
deposits in sector b reduce total monitoring costs. If ￿b ￿ ￿ ￿ (de￿ned in the proof),
then ￿ ￿
a = 0 and only agent 1b is monitored for repayment.
With one agent of type 1 in each sector and ￿b > ￿a, agent 1b has a bigger stake
in the economy. As a consequence, his surplus is higher at the benchmark allocations






￿ S (￿ xa
1; ￿ xa
2). Therefore, a relatively lower increase
in monitoring probability is enough to eliminate opportunistic behavior by 1b. Finally,
if ￿b is large enough, then there will no monitoring of repayment in sector a, because
all their production can be deposited with sector b.
We now consider an example in which the monitoring cost is borne by the type 1
agent in each sector. We show that deposits in sector b can reduce the total monitoring
cost, while agent 1a transfers resources to agent 1b as a compensation for increasing
the monitoring cost in sector b. We set U1 (x1;x2) = ￿x2 and U2 (x2;x1) = u(x2).
For simplicity, we assume the monitoring cost is paid up front by agents 1a and 1b and
only once. For any allocation xi
2, the DP and repayment constraints with deposits d
and transfers t are
￿x
a





























































d has the usual de￿nition. An allocation xi
2 is feasible if there is a ￿i
d ￿ 1 such
that the DP and repayment constraints hold. In the Appendix, we show conditions
for which xi
2 is feasible (￿ high or ￿
i, ki small). We also show that the repayment
constraints bind when d = t = 0. This gives us the monitoring probability ￿i
0 and,
therefore, the total monitoring cost c = ￿a
0ka + ￿b
0kb (as there is only one type 1
agent in each sector). Now consider d > 0 and t > 0. If d (and t) are small enough,
the monitoring probabilities are again given by the repayment constraints holding at











































To make sure agent 1b is willing to incur the additional monitoring cost, agent 1a
should free up enough resources to compensate him. The resources that are freed up









This is also the maximum transfer t that agent 1b can expect, and its liquidation
















Therefore, by combining (35) and (36), agent 1b is made better o⁄ when taking

















We summarize this discussion in the Proposition that follows.





































2]; if he has less ability to default, by which we mean a more e¢ cient




Finally, notice that there is an interesting trade-o⁄ when we consider the e¢ cient
number of bankers in general. Fewer bankers reduce the total monitoring cost, other
things being equal, but entail more deposits per banker; therefore we must use a higher
probability of monitoring to get each one to behave well. Therefore, in general, there
is an optimal number of bankers, which depends on the monitoring cost function. In
fact, even if there is only one sector ￿that is, one set of ex ante homogeneous agents ￿
if we were willing to consider asymmetric allocations, it would be desirable in general
to designate some subset of them to be banker, and concentrate monitoring e⁄orts
on them. The trade-o⁄ would again be that fewer bankers reduce costs for a given
level of monitoring but entail larger deposits per bank, which increases incentives
to renege. For illustration, let us consider our last example with a monitoring cost
function k0 + ￿k, where k0 > 0. This cost function implies increasing returns to
scale. Suppose there are n agents of type 1b, so n potential bankers. Given a feasible
allocation xb
2 and deposits d, the monitoring probability ￿if there is a single banker
















Notice that the banker now has to store his own production xb
2, the deposit d, as
well as the production of all other agents 1b, (n ￿ 1)xb
2. The total monitoring cost is




















It is ￿1=m, as the total storage can now be split in m equal parts. The total monitoring
cost, however, becomes m(k0 + ￿2k) = mk0 + ￿1k. This is clearly higher than the
cost of monitoring in the economy with a single banker. Notice that we have assumed
that the allocation xb
2 was feasible with a single banker in sector b. This may not
be always true, in which case there is a minimum number of bankers necessary to
sustain xb
2. A moment￿ s re￿ ection will convince the reader that the minimum number
of bankers m￿, guaranteeing that xb
2 is feasible given d, must satisfy ￿m￿ = 1. Clearly,

















Everything being equal, there are fewer bankers, therefore, the less they have to store,
the more they have at stake or the lower their ability to default.
5.3 Rate Of Return Dominance
In this section, we show that e¢ cient bankers need not have the best storage tech-
nology, if they are relatively better at commitment. This implies a simple rate of
return dominance result. Consider again the case in which U1 (x1;x2) = ￿x2 and
U2 (x2;x1) = u(x2). Also, let ￿a = ￿b and ￿
a = ￿
b = 1, and assume that the planner
puts equal weights on types 1 and 2, !1 = !2 = !. Each unit stored in sector i
returns 1 + ￿i, where for the sake of illustration we assume ￿a = ￿ > 0 = ￿b. We
show that, for some parameters, deposits in sector b are PE, despite a better storage
technology in sector a. Intuitively, this explains why individuals deposit wealth in
their checking accounts, despite the existence of alternative investments with higher
returns: The agents holding these deposits can be counted on to make good on their
obligations, making their liabilities good payment instruments.
35We know from the earlier analysis that for this speci￿cation, the dynamic incentive
constraints for type 2 do not bind. Hence, absent any interaction between the two




























1 + ￿i] ￿ 0 (39)




2 )(1 + ￿i) = 1. Hence,




2 . Notice that as the return increases, type 1 can reduce
production and sustain a given xi
2. Therefore, when ￿i > 0, only the repayment
constraint (39) is relevant, and the dynamic participation constraint can be ignored.
De￿ne the ￿
i for which x
￿;i
2 is feasible by ￿
i




constraint is violated at x
￿;i
2 .




, so that x￿;a is feasible in sector a but x￿;b is not
feasible in sector b.28 Here we focus on a particular case, in which deposits in sector
b are PE. In the Appendix, we verify the following:
Proposition 5 Deposits in sector b are PE if ￿
a < ￿
a




















2 is not IF in sector a, so that deposits
potentially have a role. Then consider the situation in sector b. In the ￿rst case (a),




do have inferior storage technology. Therefore, making deposits in sector b requires
agents in sector a to produce more to make up for the loss in return if they want to
sustain a given level of consumption. There is a trade-o⁄ between commitment and
28In this case, even if we assumed ￿
b > ￿
a, the repayment constraint could bind in sector b but






. There are many interesting
possibilities, some of which we analyze in the working paper (Mattesini et al. 2009).
36returns. The condition ￿
a￿=(1 + ￿) < 1 insures the commitment issue is su¢ ciently
severe so that it is worthwhile for agents in sector a to give up something on the rate
of return and deposit resources in sector b.
The second case (b) is similar, except that agents in sector b have a binding
repayment constraint when ￿
b < ￿
b
. Therefore, they need to be compensated for
taking deposits, to prevent default. A transfer from sector a does just that, but it
comes on top of the additional production required from agents in sector a to cover




b < 1, which is a stricter condition than case (a). Also, as the storage technology
of sector a improves, their commitment problem must be worse for deposits in sector
b to be PE. In any case, the key message here is that bankers are not necessarily
agents with the best investment opportunities, and for deposits to be used e¢ ciently
in payments they do not necessarily have to have the greatest return.
6 A Brief Digression on History
We have established that deposits are essential: For incentive reasons, it can be
bene￿cial for an agent who wants something from a second agent to deposit goods
with a third party ￿an intermediary ￿who holds them until they are withdrawn by
the second party. The reason is that the third party may be more credible in terms
of commitment to honor its obligations, either because this agent is more likely to be
monitored or has more at stake if he gets caught. This can be an e¢ cient arrangement,
even if the third party does not have access to the best storage technology or, more
generally, the highest return investment opportunities. As we said, we think this
resembles banking. In this section, we go into a little more detail on banking history.
We begin by discussing the fact that our theory of banking involves no outside money,
although the deposit receipts discussed above constitute inside money. We then go
on to discuss certain other features of banking history in the context of our model.
37First, banks were historically institutions that accepted deposits for a variety of
reasons, including safekeeping and access to investment opportunities. We already
mentioned the English goldsmith bankers.29 Going back in history, Mueller (1997)
describes in considerable detail the medieval Venetian bankers. He distinguishes be-
tween regular deposits, which were speci￿c goods that bankers had to deliver on
demand, and irregular deposits, involving specie or coins that only had to be repaid
with the same value (and not the same specie or coins). The depositor making an
irregular deposit tacitly agreed to the investment by the banker of the deposits. One
point we want to emphaisze is that deposits of real goods existed long before the
invention of coinage (outside money) in Lydia in the 7th century.
In ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt, for example, mainly for security and to econ-
omize on transportation costs, goods were often deposited in palaces and temples. As
Davies (2002) puts it:
Grain was the main form of deposits at ￿rst, but in the process of time
other deposits were commonly taken: other crops, fruit, cattle and agri-
cultural implements, leading eventually and more importantly to deposits
of the precious metals. Receipts testifying to these deposits gradually
led to transfers to the order not only of depositors but also to a third
party. In the course of time private houses also began to carry on such
deposit business and probably grew to be of greater importance internally
than was the case in contemporary Egypt. The banking operations of the
temple and palace based banks preceded coinage by well over a thousand
29The story of the goldsmiths which is well known, is described in standard reference books
as follows: ￿the direct ancestors of modern banks were, however, neither the merchants nor the
scrivenors but the goldsmiths. At ￿rst the goldsmiths accepted deposits merely for safekeeping; but
early in the 17th century their deposit receipts were circulating in place of money and so became
the ￿rst English bank notes￿(Encyclopedia Britannica 1954, vol. 3, p. 41). ￿The cheque came in at
an early date, the ￿rst known to the Institute of Bankers being drawn in 1670, or so￿(Encyclopedia
Britannica 1941, vol. 3, p. 68). For more specialized references, see Joslin (1954) and Quinn (1997).
Although many people call the goldsmiths the ￿rst modern bankers, some others give this credit to
the Templars; see Weatherford (1997) or Sanello (2003) for their story.
38years and so did private banking houses by some hundreds of years.
So while it is clearly interesting to analyze banking in monetary economies, we think
it is interesting and historically relevant to discuss banking even in nonmonetary
economies.
A very early development in the evolution of banking is that deposits were used
to facilitate exchange. As in the model, throughout history a second party is more
likely to give you something today if you can use the liability of a credible third
party. As we said above, notes, checks, debit cards, and related instruments issued
by commercial banks have this feature. Returning to Venice, Mueller (1997) explains
how deposits ￿served a function comparable to that of checking accounts today; that
is, it was not intended primarily for safekeeping or for earning interest but rather as a
means of payment which facilitated the clearance of debts incurred in the process of
doing business. In short, the current account constituted ￿ bank money,￿money based
on the banker￿ s promise to pay.￿ 30
In any case, this system obviously can only work if bankers are relatively credible,
or trustworthy. Our theory says that the more visiblean agent is or the more he
has at stake, the more credible he becomes. The Rialto banks in medieval Venice
o⁄er evidence consistent with this idea. ￿Little capital was needed to institute a
bank, perhaps only enough to convince the guarantors to pledge their limited backing
and clients to deposit their money, for it was deposits rather than funds invested by
partners which provided bankers with investable capital. In the ￿nal analysis, it was
the visible pratimony of the banker ￿alone or as part of a fraternal compagnia ￿and
his reputation as an operator on the market place in general which were placed on
the balance to o⁄set risk and win trust.￿(Mueller 1997, p. 97)
30According to many, those deposits did not actually circulate and transferring funds from one
account to another ￿generally required the presence at the bank of both payer and payee￿(Kohn
1999). This is the argument for regarding the goldsmiths, whose liabilities did circulate, as the
operators of the ￿rst modern banks (see also Quinn 2002). But even if they did not circulate in this
sense, the deposits of the earlier bankers cleary still facilitated payments.
39Our model also uses random monitoring and makes the assumption that when a
banker is caught cheating, he is expelled from the market. The direct evidence for this
is scant, but the history of the Venetian bankers makes us think that these features
are not far o⁄. ￿In order to maintain ￿ public faith,￿the Senate in 1467 reminded
bankers of their obligation to show their account books to depositors upon request,
for the sake of comparing records ... Penalty for noncompliance was set at 1,000
ducats.￿(Mueller 1997, p. 45). Thus, while it may have been prohibitively costly
for depositors to continuously check the books, one can imagine that monitoring
was performed every so often. And if caught cheating, the punishment was indeed
lifetime banishment from any banking activity in Venice. Apparently, this happened
very rarely ￿consistent with theory.
We also mention that many bankers historically started as merchants, who almost
by de￿nition have a greater connection to the market than a typical individual. As
Kohn (1999) describes it, for example, the great banking families in Renaissance Italy
and Southern Germany in the 16th century were originally merchants, who began
lending their own capital and then started collecting deposits from other merchants,
nobles, clerics, and small investors. They were not the wealthiest group; wealth then
was concentrated in the hands of landowners, who controlled agriculture, forests, and
mineral rights. But the merchants arguably had the most to lose from reneging on
obligations. Thus, ￿because commerce involved the constant giving and receiving of
credit, much of a merchant￿ s e⁄ort was devoted to ensuring that he could ful￿ll his
own obligations and that others would ful￿ll theirs.￿(Kohn 1999)
Also, returning again to Venice:
In the period from about 1330 to 1370, eight to ten bankers operated
on the Rialto at a given time. They seem to have been relatively small
operators on average... Around 1370, however, the situation changed [and]
Venetian noble families began to dominate the marketplace. After the
40banking crisis of the 1370s and the War of Chioggia, the number of banchi
di scritta operating at any given time on the Rialto dropped to about four,
sometimes as few as three. These banks tended, therefore, to be larger
and more important than before. Their organizational form was generally
either that of the fraterna or that of the partnership, the latter often
concluded between a citizen and a noble. (Mueller 1997, p. 82)
As in our model, there seem to have been interesting issues concerning the e¢ cient
number of bankers, and revolving around greater credibility or commitment and larger
amounts of deposits per bank.
Finally, what does our theory have to say about banking crisis in general and the
recent ￿nancial crisis in particular? Gorton (2009) argues that the recent banking
panic is a wholesale panic, whereby ￿nancial ￿rms ran on other ￿nancial ￿rms by not
renewing sale and repurchase agreements. This is akin to a retail panic in which the
depositors do not renew their demand deposits but choose to withdraw. According to
Gorton, ￿depositors￿were ￿rms that lent money in the repo market. The location of
subprime risks among their counterparties was unknown. Depositors were confused
about which counterparties were really at risk and consequently ran all banks. While
our framework is too simple to grasp the intricacies of the recent ￿nancial crisis, a
small perturbation to our model can highlight exactly this one fundamental mech-
anism. As a perturbation, we can consider that the probability to be active in the
market ￿ is subject to shocks (this is akin to technology shocks). It is then intuitive
that the uncertainty surrounding the occurence of such a shock and its magnitude can
induce agents to not renew their deposits (or deposit less) to reestablish the banker￿ s
incentives. What are these shocks? They depend on the nature of the ￿rm￿ s business.
For example, ￿ could be a⁄ected by the housing market if the ￿rm￿ s business is to
originate mortgage loans. More broadly, ￿ could also be a⁄ected by political events,
such as a declaration of war, since wars can very easily shut down trade. On this
41point, let us return to Venice one last time, as Mueller (1997, p. 127) indeed writes
￿The concatenation of commercial failures with bank failures was a constant feature.
(...) War or the threat of war was su¢ cient to close o⁄ a ￿ ourishing foreign market
suddenly with the result that stocks accumulated locally; gluts brought a fall in prices
which, in turn, caused failures.￿
In summary, although we can only touch on economic history in this paper, we
think the key features of our theory and its implications are not inconsistent with the
record.
7 Conclusion
This paper studied banking using a mechanism design approach. We began by de-
scribing an economic environment, with preferences, technologies, and certain fric-
tions including temporal separation, imperfect monitoring, commitment issues, and
costly record keeping. We described the set of IF allocations and optimal allocations.
We did not start with assumptions about what banks are, who they are, or what they
do. Rather, we looked at the set of IF or e¢ cient allocations and tried to interpret
the outcomes in terms of arrangements that resemble banking. In the model, it is
e¢ cient for certain agents, chosen endogenously based on their attachment to the
market and our ability to monitor them, to accept deposits that will help faciliate
exchange. This activity can be part of an e¢ cient arrangement even if these agents
do not have the best storage technologies or investment opportunities; if they have an
advantage in commitment, this will make them more trustworthy. Of course, other
things equal, it is better if bankers have good investment opportunities.
The arrangement generated by the model clearly resembles salient aspects of bank-
ing in both modern and historical contexts. We proved that this activity is essential:
If we were to rule it out, the set of feasible allocations would be inferior. This was not
a foregone conclusion ￿frictionless models do not have an essential role for banks. We
42also discussed issues related to who would make a good banker, how many bankers
should we have, and who should be monitored when monitoring is costly. We think
our approach is novel and complementary with other theories of banking. We also
think it is consistent with economic history. Even if some of these results are not too
surprising, one can use the theory to identify relatively precisely the relevant e⁄ects
and the nature of the trade-o⁄s. All of this comes directly out of a mechanism design
approach, without primitive assumptions about what is a bank, who is a bank, or
what banks do.
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8.2 Essential Deposits With t = 0: An Example
Here we show that deposits are essential, even when transfers are set to zero. We use
an example where type 2 are endowed with a unit of good 1, instead of a production
technology. We assume that agents of type 1 derive utility ￿ u from consuming this unit
of good 1 so that U1 (1;x2) = ￿ u￿x2. Also, since there is no production of good 1 we
set U2 (x2;x1) = u(x2). Assume the planner always transfers all of the endowment
of good 1 to type 1. Also assume ￿a = ￿b, ￿
a = ￿
b = 1 and ￿
b ￿ ￿
a. The relevant
constraints in sector b are
￿ u ￿ x
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where as before ^ xb
2 is the amount of good 2 that maximizes the transfer to sector a.
Absent transfers, we can deposit with sector b at most

















45For ease of exposition, suppose ￿ u ￿ ^ d. We now consider how the constraints in sector
a are relaxed when transfers or deposits alone are used. When only transfers are
used, the dynamic participation constraint (11) and the repayment constraint (21) in
sector a become
￿ u ￿ x
a
2 + ^ t + ￿
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In the case where only deposits are used, the dynamic participation constraint
and the repayment constraint become respectively
￿ u ￿ x
a
2 + ￿




2] ￿ 0 (47)
￿x
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2 + d + ￿




2] ￿ 0 (48)
Since d ￿ ^ d ￿ ￿ u, the repayment constraint (48) implies the dynamic participation
constraint (47). Also, as any feasible deposits satisfy d ￿ xa





For allocations where xa
2 < ^ d, (48) is equivalent to IR and hence redundant. In cases
where ^ d < xa



























a is low, (46) implies (49) and deposits implement more allocations than transfers.
The ￿gure below shows the IF set for cases where: t = d = 0 in dark red; t > 0 and
d = 0 in dark and medium red; and d > 0 and t = 0 in dark, medium, and light
red. xa
2 is represented on the x-axis, while xb
2 is on the y-axis. The key point is that,
absent transfers, the upper bound ￿ xa
2 on the IF set is independent of xb
2. This is not
the case in sector b, as deposits from sector a in￿ uence incentives directly.31
31The ￿gure is somewhat deceptive as it is not necessarily the case that the upper bound on the
IF set in sector a with only transfers equals the one with only deposits. Also, note that for low ￿ u,
some allocations are feasible with only transfers and not with only deposits; indeed, for ￿ u = 0, only
transfers work.
46Figure 9: Fixed endowment.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
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The repayment constraint in sector a is ￿￿
a (xa

















Therefore, increasing deposits from sector a to b reduces the overall monitoring cost
￿ ￿






































, ￿a ￿ ￿b and kb ￿ ka. Hence,
from d = 0, only d > 0 can reduce total monitoring cost.
47To prove the second part of the proposition, let ￿ xa solve maxx Wa (x), subject to
















then it is optimal to set ￿ ￿
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8.4 Existence of Feasible Allocations (Section 5.2)







































R be the monitoring probability such that the DP and repayment con-
straint bind respectively. The repayment constraint is satis￿ed only if ￿i
0 ￿ ￿i
R. The
DP is satis￿ed only if ￿i
0 ￿ ￿i
P. Therefore, given an allocation xi
2, ￿i
0 exists only if
￿i
R ￿ ￿i






























2 is feasible if this condition holds. Since the planner seeks to mini-
mize the monitoring cost for each allocation xi
2, he will set ￿i
0 = ￿i
R for any feasible
allocation.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The planner￿ s problem with no interaction between sectors is given by (37). The ￿rst
best solution is given by x￿i
2 solving u0(x
￿;i
2 ) = 1=(1 + ￿i). Denote by xi
2, the level of
xi
2 that satis￿es the repayment constraint (39) as an equality. Because of concavity,
u(xi
2)=xi
2 is decreasing xi






















=(1 + ￿i) as the level of market connection below
which the repayment constraint binds in sector i. These next two claims establish
Proposition 5.




















, the solution to (37) in sector b is xb
2. Deposits are
incentive compatible only if agents 1a make a transfer ￿ to agents 1b. The re-
payment constraint in sector b with transfer ￿ and deposits d evaluated at xb
2 is
￿xb















= 0 and the
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b. The repayment
constraint with transfers in sector a is
￿(x
a















Substituting ￿ = d=￿













































d ￿ ￿: (52)
Subtituting ￿ = d=￿
b into (52), as well as the value for d such that the repayment














2), the last inequality following
from concavity. Therefore, we need xa
2 < xb







(1 + ￿). Fi-
nally, the repayment constraint is still the relevant constraint when d is small enough.
This completes the proof.








a￿ < 1 + ￿.
Proof. Given xa
2 and d, agents 1a have to produce y such that xa
2 = (y ￿ d)(1 + ￿)+
d. For small d, only the repayment constraint is relevant,
￿(x
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To show deposits are PE in sector b, we show that increasing d relaxes the repayment
constraint in sector a. The left side of (53) is increasing in d i⁄ ￿
a￿ < 1 + ￿: The
left side of (53) is decreasing in xa
2. Therefore, ￿
a￿ < 1 + ￿ implies that increasing d
allows higher xa
2.
Finally, we need to show that welfare is increasing in d at xa



























Since u0(xa) > 1=(1 + ￿), this condition is always satis￿ed.
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